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Abstract. Social capital is widely recognized as an important aspect of regional 
economies, and social networks in particular have recently been the focus of research in 
economic sociology and economic geography. Building on this body of work, this research 
explores the role of social networks in the divergent economic fortunes of two highly 
advance Californian metropolitan regions over the past three decades, Los Angeles and 
the Bay Area. Proxies for the two regions’ industrial social structures are constructed 
and analysed at three cross sections over the divergence period: 1982, 1995 and 2010. 
Network analysis shows that the Bay Area’s industrial social structure maintains a high 
level of connectivity, bridging relations across industrial boundaries, and by 2010 has a 
highly connected and central business-civic organization, the Bay Area Council. The LA 
region’s social structure, on the other hand, fragments substantially over the period. 
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“If I’ve learned anything in the last seven years, it’s that ideas live less in the minds of 
individuals than in the interaction of communities” (Fred Turner, 2006: VII).  
 
Introduction 
Institutions and social capital have risen to the forefront of academic and policy attention as 
important aspects of economic development. While initial factor endowments capture the static 
combination of building blocks in an economy, institutional and sociological perspectives 
attempt to understand how these factors are combined and recombined in a socially interactive 
and dynamic process of economic and industrial development. Two comparably endowed 
economies can take different industrial pathways in part due to their distinct formal and 
informal institutional contexts (laws, norms, beliefs and relations), which in turn impact 
industrial development and per capita incomes, arguably evident by persistently high residuals 
in income-growth regressions (Rodríguez-Pose, 2013). 
 
High-end entrepreneurship, intra-preneurship and innovation steer the industrial trajectory 
of regions as it branches out into new industrial categories and sub-categories. This process is 
driven by economic actors responding to perceived challenges and opportunities by combining 
and re-combining resources, people and organizations in pursuit of new lucrative opportunities. 
Economic sociologists and geographers have identified three network features characteristic of 
highly entrepreneurial firms, small resilient cities and innovative industrial clusters: 
connectivity, diversity and centrality. These structural features facilitate the flow of knowledge 
and novel ideas and the forging of new connections in pursuit of innovative and lucrative 
commercial endeavours. 
 
The research that follows broadens the scope of analysis of past research to the corporate 
social structures of two highly advanced US metropolitan regions whose per capita incomes 
diverged substantially since the early 1980s: The Bay Area and Los Angeles metropolitan 
regions. The Bay Area is the quintessential poster child of high-end entrepreneurship and 
innovation, while the Los Angeles region has been much less innovative over the past three 
decades. Network analysis shows that over the 30 years of economic divergence the structure 
of relations in the two regions’ high-end corporate social networks also diverged substantially. 
Moreover, the network features found to characterize highly entrepreneurial communities, 
resilient cities and innovative clusters are characteristic of the Bay Area’s high-end corporate 
social network throughout the period: connectivity, diversity and centrality of an ‘anchor 
tenant’. These are precisely the features theorized as facilitating the combination and re-
combination of assets, people and organizations in response to perceived challenges and 
opportunities.  
 
This article begins with a literature review of the role of social capital and social networks 
in economic outcomes, followed by the methodology section explaining the rationale behind 
chosen proxies for the two regions’ social contexts and sampling frame. We then present the 
results of our network analysis and conclude. ‘The most crucial aspect of Silicon Valley is its 
networks’. There is no proposition so universally agreed upon and so little studied (Castilla et 
al., 2000: 218).  
Institutions and economic development: A literature review  
The social capital literature is based on the notion that certain features of society such as norms, 
trust, identities and membership determine the propensity for cooperation between agents 
(Fukuyama, 1999). Putnam defines social capital as ‘features of social organization, such as 
networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit’ 
(Putnam and Leonardi, 1993: 38).  
 
Social scientists, namely urban focused economists, economic geographers and economic 
sociologists, have studied the role of social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; North, 
1981, 1990, 2005; Putnam, 2000) and social networks (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2008; Glaeser 
et al., 1995; Granovetter, 1985; Jaffe et al., 1993; Powell et al., 2012; Saxenian, 1996) in 
regional economies and industrial structures. Social capital and the structure of social networks 
in which it is embedded influence how actors in an economy interact. While formal institutions 
to a great extent determine the ‘rules of the game in a society’ (North, 1990: 3), the ‘humanely-
devised constraints that shape human interactions’ (North, 1990: 3) are also shaped by 
important aspects of society, such as networks, trust, norms and ideology. Different 
conventions and relations in urban centres can generate differences in the way people from 
across various organizations interact and respond to collective challenges and opportunities 
(Storper, 1997).  
 
Social capital and social networks have arguably become increasingly important in 
economic development in the post-Fordist economy as labour markets have become more 
flexible, production more fragmented and vertically disintegrated and competition more 
intensive (Scott, 1988; Storper, 1992). Social capital can increase the efficiency and flexibility 
of the labour market (Granovetter, 1985, 2005); lower transactions costs by generating trust 
between agents (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Fukuyama, 1999; Putnam, 2000), limiting moral 
hazards (Putnam, 2000) and reducing the reliance on formal contractual agreements 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Storper, 2006; Storper, 1997); and facilitate knowledge creation and 
spillover (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Easterly, 2001; Granovetter, 1985; Wade, 1987). The 
latter in particular plays a crucial role in agglomeration economies and long-run economic 
growth, as emphasized by contemporary growth theory (Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Grossman 
and Helpman, 1991; Jones, 2004; Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1993). These 
positive aspects of informal institutions correspond with the three widely recognized 
agglomeration economies of ‘matching’, ‘sharing’ and ‘learning’ (Duranton and Puga, 2004; 
Marshall, 1890). Informal institutions are thus theorized as being integral to processes of 
agglomeration and innovation, and consequently regional economic development. 
 
The link between propinquity (which reduces the transactions costs between agents 
facilitating the development of social capital) and ‘learning’ is substantiated by so-called 
paper-trail studies (Jaffe and Tranjtenberg, 1999, 1998; Jaffe et al., 1993; Sonn and Storper, 
2008), and research using other proxy measures of innovation inputs, such as R&D spending 
(Jaffe, 1986; Patel and Pavitt, 1991), and innovation output, namely new product developments 
(Feldman, 1994). In a literature review of this body of research, Feldman concludes that 
‘knowledge spillovers tend to be geographically bounded within the region where new 
economic knowledge was created. That is, there are geographic limitations to the spillovers of 
new economic knowledge’ (Feldman, 1999: 4). Knowledge diffuses unevenly across space 
because it is more easily absorbed by actors connected to the social structure in which it is 
developed (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). These social connections require frequent face-to-face 
contact due to the tacit nature of knowledge, thus benefiting from propinquity.  
 
Propinquity between agents in geographic space, however, does not insure interaction; it 
simply reduces the physical distance between agents and consequently transaction cost, 
facilitating interaction. Interaction is further facilitated by social relations between agents. In 
this sense, studies of the role of networks and social capital in economic development are 
essentially sociological studies of agglomeration and transactions costs. The ‘social distance’ 
between agents in two equally populated and dense cities (i.e. between equally distanced 
agents) can be markedly different, depending on the social structure or ‘conventions and 
relations’ that connect these agents (Storper, 1997). Economic geographers and economic 
sociologists essentially study two inter-related dimensions of agglomeration economies, 
geography and social relations, both of which determine transactions costs.  
 
Closely knit clusters and communities, however, can have negative effects on economic 
outcomes due to the agency problems that they generate (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; North, 
1981; Olson, 1965), especially in contexts of weak formal institutions (Rodriguez-Pose and 
Storper, 2006). Research shows, for example, that the overall development of southern Italy 
has suffered from negative externalities associated with the dominance of closely knit 
clientilistic and rent-seeking groups (Triglia, 1992). Moreover, such group ‘bonding’ with little 
inter-group ‘bridging’ can bring about deep social divisions that can limit an economy’s overall 
growth potential (Aghion et al., 2004; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Rodrigues-pose and Storper 
argue that group ‘bonding’ must be balanced with the ‘bridging’ mechanisms of formal 
institutions in order to avoid such negative externalities (Rodriguez- Pose and Storper, 2006). 
Cross-cutting social relations are arguably an additional ‘bridging’ mechanism that can also 
limit the negative externalities of strong community ‘bonding’ (Makarem, 2013).  
 
The link between social networks and economic outcomes can be traced back to Alfred 
Marshall’s (1890) observations about the development and diffusion of ideas in English 
industrial districts. Since then social scientists from different fields such as regional science, 
economic geography and economic sociology have sought to better understand the role of 
social networks in regional economies. Granovetter argued in his seminal work on the social 
embeddedness of economic activities drew attention to the importance of what he called ‘weak-
ties in the transmission of novel ideas and information between close-knit communities ties’ 
(Granovetter, 1985). Jane Jacobs attributed the economic and entrepreneurial dynamism in 
cities to the diversity and ease of social interactions in dense urban centres (Jacobs, 1969). 
Research on Silicon Valley attributed the region’s entrepreneurial dynamism to its dense 
networks and culture (Kenney and Florida, 2000; Kenney and von Burg, 2001; Saxenian, 1983, 
1990, 1996; Sturgeon, 2000), findings echoed in research on industrial districts in Europe 
(Bagnasco, 1977; Brusco, 1986; Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Kristensen, 1992; Piore and Sabel, 
1984; Storper and Harrison, 1991; Triglia, 1992). Saxenian argues that ‘The network 
perspective helps explain the divergent performance of apparently comparable regional 
clusters’ (Saxenian, 2001: 42). 
 
Researchers adopted social network analysis techniques to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the role of networks in regional economic outcomes. Safford showed that the 
structure of civic relations shaped the trajectories of economic change in two rust-belt cities, 
enabling one to better respond collectively to economic challenges than the other. He attributed 
successful collective action and mobilization of key organizational actors in response to the 
city’s economic challenges to interactions between actors from across social, political and 
economic divisions, highlighting the role of centrally positioned civic organizations in the 
development and coordination of strategic initiatives (Safford, 2004).  
 
Powell and his colleagues found that highly successful biotechnology clusters are 
characterized by diverse and connected organizational forms. The diversity he argues ‘provides 
a rich soup in which practices, strategies and rules can emerge’ from a process which ‘involves 
search, recombining, sense-making, and luck’ (Powell, 2010: 12). He also highlights the 
important connecting role played by an ‘anchor tenant’, an organization that does not compete 
directly with other types of organizations but rather ‘becomes scaffolding that, either 
intentionally or unexpectedly, assists subsequent connections and field formation’ (Powell, 
2010: 13). Well-connected actors from diverse business communities thus catalysed the 
entrepreneurial dynamism that led to the genesis of highly successful biotechnology clusters 
(Powell et al., 2012a, 2012b, Powell and Sandholtz, 2012; Powell et al., 2005).  
 
Feldman and Zoller also used network analysis to show that highly entrepreneurial regions 
are characterized by a disproportionate number of ‘dealmakers’ (Feldman and Zoller, 2012). 
These serial entrepreneurs bring together actors from distinct fields on the corporate boards of 
new ventures. They ‘assume roles that make the connections from which knowledge spills over 
to lower the costs of engaging in innovative activity, thus creating regional vibrancy’ (Feldman 
and Zoller, 2012: 3). Their research builds on a body of research highlighting the catalytic role 
played by centrally positioned information brokers that connect actors from distinct 
communities (Myint et al., 2005; Pollock et al., 2004; Suchman, 2000; Winch and Courtney, 
2007).  
 
Cutting across these studies is the notion that social contexts whose actors are more diverse 
and connected, all else being equal, are more creative, innovative and able to forge new 
relations in the face of collective economic challenges and opportunities. The above-reviewed 
research, however, falls-short of exploring this theoretical proposition at the scale of large 
metropolitan regions; the subsequent research attempts to fill this gap by broadening the scope 
of analysis to the corporate social structures of two metropolitan regions in the State of 
California.  
 
Case selection  
The 10 County Bay Area1 and 5 County Los Angeles2 metropolitan regions are two highly 
advanced regions in the State of California which had successfully grown their populations, 
employment base and wages over the course of the 20th-century. They are both subject to the 
same state and federal systems of government, thus controlling for major differences in formal 
institutions,3 openness to international trade, capital controls, immigration laws and macro-
economic conditions.  
 
By 1980, they were both in the top-tier of the US regional income hierarchy, with very 
similar levels of per capita incomes, income inequality, housing costs and construction 
restrictiveness (Makarem, 2013; Storper et al., 2015). Their industrial structures were also 
comparable, with similar shares of employment in IT, similar sophistication in their 
occupational task contents and similar patents per capita (Makarem, 2013; Storper et al., 2015). 
Over the course of the subsequent three decades, however, the two regions diverged 
substantially in their per capita incomes. By 2010, the average Los Angeles resident earned 
almost 30% less than the average Bay Area resident, and the Los Angeles region had slipped 
down the rankings of US regional incomes from 9th place back in 1980 to 26th place in 20104 
(see Table 1). 
 
While the Bay Area’s economic success is attributed to its specialization in the IT sector, 
this view is retrospective. Back in 1970, the employment share of IT workers in the Bay Area 
and the Los Angeles region was almost identical at 2.6%, which in light of LA’s relative size 
meant twice as many Information Technology (IT) workers in LA (almost 82,000 in LA versus 
just below 39,000 in the Bay Area as shown in Table 2). By 2010, however, the Bay Area’s 
share of IT employment rose to nearly 11%, larger than LA’s in both relative and absolute 
terms (255,000 in the Bay Area compared to just over 150,000 in LA). An economic observer 
back in the 1970s and early 1980s might have favoured the prospects of LA based on the 
region’s human capital in the IT industry, the large number of aerospace engineers which back 
in 1970 was even larger than its stock of IT workers, and its leading agglomeration in the 
entertainment industry (see Table 2). 
 
Table 1. Per capita incomes in the LA and Bay Area CMSAs, 1980 and 2010. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using BRR15 data. 
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Table 2. Number and share of IT and aerospace & defense industry workers in LA and the Bay 
Area, 1970–2010. 
 
Source: Calculations by Tom Kemeny based on collections of 4-digit SIC codes (1970) and 
6-digit NAICS codes (2010) using County Business Patterns (Storper et al., 2015). 
 
Why did these two advanced US metropolitan regions in the same State of California 
respond so differently to the challenges of the new economy? Economists would point to 
differences in initial factor endowments.  
 
A regression analysis predicting 2010 per capita incomes for US metropolitan regions 
controlling for major determinants of income-growth back in 1980 (and a second model 
controlling for changes in some variables over time) shows that the Bay Area’s actual 2010 
income was 22% above its expected value, whereas LA’s was 7% below its expected value 
(Makarem, 2013). The analysis controlled for population size (and growth in a second model), 
cost of housing, measures of human capital, ethnic composition (and change in a second 
model), industrial structure and levels of innovation (see descriptive statistics of control 
variables in Appendix 1). Numerous specifications yielded comparable results presented in 
Appendix 2. The analysis shows that neither the spectacular income growth of the Bay Area 
nor the lackluster income growth of the LA region can be satisfactorily explained by initial 
factor endowments.  
 
The disappointing performance of the LA region is often attributed to the decline of the 
aerospace sector, which is blamed on political decisions in Washington in the late 1980s that 
reassigned military contracts to other regions (Thomas and Ong, 2002). While the decline of 
the aerospace sector took a heavy toll on employment, shrinking from 3.4% of regional 
employment in 1970 to 0.9% in 2010 (see Table 2), this does not explain why the region was 
unable to grow its employment in high-waged sectors of the new economy, such as IT and 
biotechnology. Moreover, while its entertainment industry is a hugely successful story, having 
grown from 0.7% of regional employment in 1970 to 2.5% in 2010, its size relative to the 
regional economy is insufficient for maintaining the region’s per capita income relative to other 
regions.  
 
LA’s failure to sufficiently exploit commercial and technological opportunities in the new 
economy is striking given the region’s promising position in the early days of the biotech 
industry (see Powell et al., 2012a), its wealth of highly skilled technology workers in the 
aerospace industry (Taner Osman’s case study of the aerospace and defence industry in Storper 
et al., 2015), its global dominance in the entertainment industry (with its branching-out 
potential into related high-waged sectors such as animation, digital content creation, video 
games and high-fashion design) (Makarem, 2013; Storper et al., 2015), and a 2.7% share of IT 
workers in 1970, equivalent to that of the Bay Area and double its size in absolute terms (see 
IT case study by Taner Osman and analysis of industrial composition by Tom Kemeny, in 
Storper et al., 2015).  
 
The Bay Area’s relatively high income growth was, to a great extent, driven by highly 
innovative activities and entrepreneurial ventures in the IT industry. Figure 1 shows the 
divergence in the number of patents granted to each region between 1975 and 2005 in two IT 
sub-sectors, computers and communications, and electrical and electronics (data analysed by 
Tom Kemeny and presented in Storper et al., 2015). The two regions’ innovation capacities in 
these two IT sub-sectors diverged tremendously since the early 1990s. This divergence in 
innovation capacity is also evident in the overall level of patents filed: by 2010, the total 
number of patents per capita in LA was 36, compared to 48 in the Bay Area (Makarem, 2013, 
using Building Resilient Regions (BRR) data). The period of economic divergence coincided 
with a divergence in the two regions’ industrial structures and innovation capacities.  
 
As initial factor endowments cannot sufficiently explain the evolution of these two metro-
regions’ per capita incomes, innovation capacities and industrial structures,5 it is 
plausible that differences in the two regions’ social structures played a role in their 
divergence. Back in 1980, the LA region seemed poised to exploit the opportunities of the 
new economy by innovating and branching out into high-skilled and innovative sectors of the 
new economy. The region’s economic story, however, did not unfold as one might have 
expected. While the Bay Area over-performed relative to US regions with comparable initial 
factor endowments, LA’s under-performed. The research that follows explores the role the 
two regions’ industrial social structures might have played in their economic divergence.  
 
 
 Figure 1. USPTO utility patents granted by region, 1975–2005.  
Source: Calculations by Tom Kemeny based on NBER patent data, as cleaned and organized 
in Sonn and Storper, 2008 (Storper et al. 2015). 
 
 
Methodology  
Economic actors are embedded in a structure of social relations which span regional and extra-
regional social networks. The challenge of measuring the regional social structure in which 
economic actors are embedded is operationalized by restricting the analysis to directors who 
sit on the boards of the largest corporations and private foundations in the two regions. Social 
relations between these board members is proxied by board interlocks: If a director sits on the 
boards of two organizations, then the board members of these two organizations are considered 
to be socially related (they are acquainted).  
 
In theory, corporate board members constitute economic actors whose network of 
interlocked boards forms ‘a social institution’ (Davis, 1996: 1) which acts as a ‘communication 
system’ (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985: 141) whose membership is selected through personal ties 
(Mizruchi, 1996), with the overall network reflecting ‘the embeddedness of corporate 
governance in social structures (e.g. friendship or other ties)’ (Davis, 1996: 1). Private 
foundations are also included in the analysis because corporate directors often sit on the boards 
of private foundations, and therefore including private foundations in the analysis incorporates 
an important channel of social connections. The network of corporate and philanthropic board 
interlocks is therefore an appropriate proxy for gauging ‘who knows whom’ and ‘who has 
direct and indirect but proximate access to whom’ amongst actors in a region’s industrial 
structure.  
 
The sample of firms is restricted to the largest 60–70 corporations and 50 largest private 
foundations in each region in 1982, 1995 and 2010. Research shows that larger firms have a 
higher propensity to share board members with other firms, and moreover that these firms are 
more likely to be other large firms (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; Levine, 1977; Mizruchi and 
Stearns, 1988). Selecting a sample of the largest firms rather than a random sample of firms 
from across the industrial structure, therefore, minimizes the risk of selection bias (unequal 
propensity to interlock) and selects the pool of firms with the most number of board interlocks 
(the proxy for social relations).  
 
As well as exploring the overall structure of board interlocks amongst the largest firms, the 
analysis also explores the degree to which these relations connect firms across 
industrial boundaries. Board interlocks across industries are used as a proxy for relations 
between diverse communities within the overall industrial structure, i.e. diversity.  
 
The structure of relations amongst the most influential business and philanthropic leaders in 
a region is arguably representative of a much broader social structure (‘a friend of yours is a 
friend of mine’). If for instance the corporate board of an aerospace company is interlocked 
with the board of an IT company, it is likely that other actors from these two industries’ social 
worlds are also connected, either directly or indirectly through this ‘weak tie’.  
 
In addition to exploring the structure of relations across the two regions’ industrial structures 
by measuring the degree of overall connectivity and bridging relations across industries, the 
analysis adds the five most prominent business-civic organizations (BCOs) to the networks in 
2010.6 The purpose of BCOs such as chambers of commerce and business associations is to 
act as convening bodies for the business community. Their primary objective or ‘raison-d’être’ 
is to represent the needs and interests of the business community. It is conceivable, therefore, 
that such organizations, through their board interlocks, connect otherwise disconnected 
corporations in the above networks, acting as ‘anchor tenants’ in the overall network.  
 
A total of 386 corporations and 4130 board members were analysed, equivalent to an 
average of 64 corporations and 688 board members per region for each of the three cross 
sections (1982, 1995 and 2010). The average number of board members per firm was 11, 
consistent with findings in the broader directorate interlock literature (Hallock, 1997).  
 
Firms were ranked by total revenues using Dunn’s Business Rankings7 publication for the 
1982 sample, the Wharton Research data Service and the 1995 Dunn’s Business Rankings for 
the 1995 samples and the Dunn and Brad Street 2010 Million Dollar Directory and Morningstar 
Inc. (10K Wizard database) for the 2010 samples. The directors’ names were extracted from 
the list of board members found in the corporate 10-Ks (the tax documents filed by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS)), or firms’ annual reports. The 10Ks of firms in the 1982 sample were 
accessed from archives held at the Jackson library at Stanford University. The 1995 and 2010 
10-Ks were accessed online from the Edgar database (available free online from the Securities 
and Exchange Commission). The sample sizes for each cross section were 70 firms in 1982, 
60 in 1995 and 63 in 2010. The sample sizes differ slightly due to data availability.  
 
Private foundations were ranked by total assets by accessing data from the foundation 
directory 9th edition for the 1982 sample, and the National Centre for Charitable Statistics 
(NCCS) online databases for the 1995 and 2010 samples. The names of trustees were extracted 
from the 990 forms submitted by private foundations to the IRS for reporting purposes. They 
were accessed from Indiana University Perdue University Indianapolis Library Archives for 
the 1982 and 1995 samples, and from the NCCS online archive for the 2010 samples.  
 
The database of director and trustee names was ‘cleaned’ by insuring identical spelling, and 
names whose spellings differed were matched through a combination of consistent rules and 
internet searches to insure that, for example, John D Smith is the same person as John Dereck 
Smith.8  
 
The five most prominent business-civic organizations (BCOs) in each region were selected 
by following a two-stage sampling method: In the first stage, a snowball strategy was used, 
whereby academics and practitioners in business and civic communities were asked to name 
the most prominent BCOs in their regions. In the second stage, organizations identified in stage 
one were ranked by their exposure in newspapers, by ranking them by media hits using Nexis-
Lexis, and selecting the top five most cited organizations.  
 
Findings  
 
Corporate networks  
The corporate board networks in the two regions were very similar back in 1982 and were both 
highly connected with around 60% of firms connected to at least one other firm, and around 
55% of firms connected to each other in the largest component9 in both regions.  
 
By 2010, the Bay Area corporate network had maintained its high number of board 
interlocks, with 78% of firms connected to at least one other firm and 57% of firms connected 
to each other in its largest component. In the LA region, on the other hand, the corporate 
network by 2010 had fragmented significantly over the period, with 41% of firms connected 
to at least one other firm, and more tellingly, only 19% connected to each other in the largest 
component (as illustrated in Figure 2). There was a large decline in the size of LA’s largest 
component between 1995 and 2010.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage of sampled firms in largest component, by year, LA vs. SF.  
Source: Author’s calculation, number of interlocked firms in each network’s largest component 
as a percentage of all firms in the sample 
 
 
Figures 3(a) and (b) show graphic representations of the two regions’ sampled corporate 
networks in 1982 and 2010. Figure 3(a) shows a graphical representation of the LA and Bay 
Area networks in 1982; they are very similar, with 38 firms in LA’s largest component, and 42 
in the Bay Area’s. The two regions’ most connected firms are their largest banks and utility 
companies: Security Pacific Corp and Southern California Edison in Southern California; and 
Wells Fargo and Pacific Gas and Electric in the Bay Area, each connected to about 11 other 
firms.  
 
By 2010, as illustrated in Figure 3(b), the LA network has all but completely fragmented, 
with a mere 12 firms in the largest component, compared to 36 in the Bay Area’s. Avery 
Denison in Southern California is the most connected firm in the region’s sampled firms, 
connected to just four other firms, compared to Intuit in the Bay Area with connections to seven 
other firms, and Intel and Cisco with connections to six other firms each. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. (a) LA and SF networks of board interlocks, 1980 and (b) LA and SF networks of 
board interlock, 2010. 
Source: Author’s calculations using UCINET14 and NET-Draw. 
 
 
This analysis shows the gradual fragmentation in LA’s high-end corporate social structure 
between 1980 and 1995, and the accelerated fragmentation between 1995 and 2010. The Bay 
Area’s corporate network, however, maintains its relatively high level of connectivity 
throughout the 30-year period. The networks are now broadened to include the 50 largest 
private foundations. 
 Broader corporate-philanthropic networks 
The broader corporate-philanthropic networks generate results consistent with the above 
exclusively corporate analyses: Both regions had highly connected high-end corporate-
philanthropic social structures back in 1982, with about half the organizations – firms and 
private foundations – in both regions’ broader networks connected to at least one other 
organization (recall the figure back in 1982 for the corporate network was around 60% in both 
regions, here with almost double the number of organizations, the percentage is only slightly 
lower, at 53% and 51% in LA and the Bay Area, respectively). 
 
Between 1982 and 1985, the Bay Area network maintained its degree of inter-organizational 
connectivity, while the LA network by 1995 began to show signs of fragmentation, as 
illustrated in Figure 4. By 2010, the LA corporate-philanthropic network continued to 
fragment, whereas SF’s network become more connected than in either 1982 or 1995, with 
62% of organizations connected to at least one other organization by 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Percentage of organizations connected to at least one other organization in the 
broader corporate-philanthropic networks in LA and the Bay Area, 1982, 1995 and 2010. 
Source: Author’s calculations using UCI-NET. 
 
 
The story holds for the size of the largest components (see Figure 5); both regions’ largest 
components shrank between 1980 and 1995, but while LA continued its downward trend, by 
2010 the San Francisco region (SF) reversed this trend and almost re-gained the number of 
corporations and private foundations it had in its largest component back in 1980. 
 
 Figure 5. Number of organizations in largest component (Corporate-Philanthropic networks), 
1980, 1995 and 2010. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Private foundations do not play much of a bridging role in the corporate networks, evident 
by the few firms added to the combined network. Moreover, the number of private foundations 
in the combined networks in all cross sections is very similar across the two regions; therefore, 
their inclusion in a broader corporate-philanthropic network makes virtually no difference to 
the results from the above strictly corporate network analysis. 
 
Whether the analysis is restricted to the structure of the high-end corporate networks or 
broadened to the high-end corporate-philanthropic networks, findings are consistent and tell 
the same story: the Los Angeles and Bay Area corporate and corporate-philanthropic networks 
were both highly connected back in 1980, a level of connectivity maintained by the Bay Area 
over the subsequent three decades, in stark contrast to LA’s increasingly fragmented network 
structure. The most prominent and representative BCOs are now added to the 2010 networks 
to explore their degree of connectivity and centrality. 
 
Centrality of BCOs 
In network analysis, the concept of centrality is captured by a measure called ‘betweenness 
centrality’, which measures the number of times a node falls on the shortest path between all 
pairs of nodes in a network.10 The greater the centrality of a BCO, the more it plays a central 
connecting role in its network, reducing the ‘social distance’ between nodes. It is helpful to 
convert this absolute measure into a percentage of all shortest paths for comparison across 
networks, whereby an ‘nBetweeness’ score of say 15% for node A means that node A lies on 
15% of all the shortest paths between all node pairs in the network. 
 
Network analysis of board interlocks between the corporate-philanthropic networks and the 
five selected BCOs was conducted for each region in the year 2010. The results, which are 
presented in Table 3, reveal the Bay Area Council in the Bay Area to be the most central 
organization in the network, with an nBetweeness score of 18% (i.e. The Bay Area Council 
lies on 18% of the shortest paths between all node pairs in the largest component, within which 
it is embedded). This is three times greater than the LA Chamber of Commerce, the most 
central BCO in the LA network, with an nBetweeness score of 5.86%. 
 
The remaining BCOs in LA have very low centrality scores, with LAEDC lying on fewer 
than 2% of all the shortest paths between nodes, less than 1% for the Valley Industry and 
Commerce Association, and zero centrality for the Orange County Business Council and 
CALSTART. In the Bay Area, on the other hand, following the Bay Area Council is the Silicon 
Valley Leadership group which lies on the shortest path of 6% of all organization pairs, the 
San Francisco Chamber of Commerce with a centrality measure of just below 6% and the Semi-
Conductor Industry Association also with an nBetweeness score of 6%. Only the JV:SV in the 
Bay Area does not lie on the shortest path of any two nodes in the network. 
 
Table 3. Degree and betweenness centrality measures of BCOs in the Bay Area and Southern 
California, 2010.  
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using UCINET and NetDraw. 
 A closer look at the type of organizations connected to each BCO also reveals noteworthy 
differences. Almost half of the LA Chambers’ connections are to private foundations (4 out of 
9), three to other BCOs (the OC Business Council, the Valley Industry and Commerce 
Association and LAEDC) and only two of the region’s sampled largest corporation, Unified 
Grocers which is not connected to any other firm in the region, and Aecom Technology Corp 
which is connected to only two other firms. The Bay Area Council, on the other hand, is 
connected to 12 other organizations, only two more than the LA Chamber, but seven of these 
board interlocks are with firms in the 2010 sample of corporations (over 10% of the region’s 
largest firms).  
 
The Bay Area Council arguably plays the role of an ‘anchor tenant’ within the region’s 
industrial social structure. No comparable BCO exists in LA. The analysis proceeds to explore 
the degree of bridging cross-industry relations in these regional networks.  
 
Cross-industry relations  
A region’s industrial social structure is composed of actors from across its various industries. 
A diverse industrial social structure would, therefore, include connected actors from different 
industries in the network. In this section, the diversity of the LA and Bay Area networks 
are analysed over time, by analyzing the degree to which board interlocks connect 
corporations in different industries. 
 
Before presenting the results of the analysis, it is important to explore the industrial 
composition of sampled firms at each cross section, to see whether the results might be biased 
by the number of industries in each sampled cross section. Consistent with the overall 
specialization of the Bay Area economy and the diversification of the LA economy over the 
divergence period, the number of 2-Digit SIC codes representing the sample of firms also 
diverges over time. The LA and Bay Area samples of firms in 1982 and 1995 are almost 
identically diverse, representing approximately 30 2-Digit SIC industrial categories in each 
cross section (see Table 4). Between 1995 and 2010, however, the industrial structures of the 
two regional samples diverge substantially. By 2010, the Bay Area sample represents 21 2-
Digit SIC industrial categories, compared to 36 (greater than in 1982 and 1995 samples) in LA. 
 
Table 4. Number of 2-Digit SIC codes represented by sample firms in the two regions. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using SIC codes assigned to each firm by the IRS, and re-
categorized where deemed appropriate. 
 
 
The analysis also reveals greater concentration of firms in fewer industries in the Bay Area 
samples over time. For instance in 2010, the three industries with the greatest number of 
sampled firms represented only 12 of the largest 50 firms in LA, compared to 37 in the Bay 
Area. A greater number of firms is concentrated in a fewer number of industries in the Bay 
Area sample. 
 
Given the greater degree of industrial specialization and concentration in the Bay Area in 
2010, one would expect a random network11 of board interlocks to generate more cross-
industry ties in LA than in the Bay Area12 over time. The findings that follow, however, show 
otherwise. 
 
Several measures are needed to analyse the degree of cross-industry relations. To begin with, 
two measures are used: the degree of cross-industry pairs represents the number of industry 
pairs that are connected through board interlocks, and the number of cross-industry ties (board 
interlocks) represents the number of board interlock between firms in different industries. The 
analysis is conducted at two scales of industrial classification to control for the possibility that 
the 2-Digit industrial classification over-estimates industrial distinctiveness.13 To do so the 
analysis is also conducted at the level of divisions, which categorize firms into nine broad 
industrial categories. 
 
No matter which level of industrial classification is used, results using various proxies for 
cross-industry bridging consistently show the two regions to have similar levels of bridging 
relations back in 1982, and these measures diverge over the period of economic divergence. In 
fact the LA regions had a greater number of cross-industry pairs and ties at both the 2-Digit  
 
SIC level of analysis and at the division level back in 1982. By 1995 and even more so by 
2010, the Bay Area had a greater number of cross-industry pairs and cross-industry ties than 
LA. In 2010, the Bay Area network had 30 cross-industry pairs compared to 22 in LA, and 52 
versus 27 cross-industry ties across 2-Digit SIC industrial categories. While the number of 
cross-division pairs is comparable (albeit a little higher in LA throughout the period), which is 
expected given the broadness of this industrial classification, by 2010 the Bay Area network 
had more than double the number of board interlocks that connect firms across these broad 
industrial categories (43 compared to 19 in LA – see Table 5). 
 
Table 5. Cross-industry pairs and ties. 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using UCI-Net. 
 In order to make sure that these cross-industry ties are not predominantly due to a very small 
number of highly connected industries, the analysis also compared the average number of 
cross-industry ties, as well as the maximum number of cross-industry ties exhibited by the 
most connected industry. Again results show the two networks to be very similar back in 
1982, with identical average number of cross-industry ties (Mean Degree), and number of ties 
connecting the most connected industry to other industries (Table 6). The networks again 
diverge across these two measures over the period. By 2010, the average number of cross-
industry ties in the Bay Area network is 5, compared to 1.5 in the LA network, and the most 
connected industry in the Bay Area dwarfs the most connected industry in LA, with 21 versus 
5 cross-industry ties. 
 
Table 6. Average number of cross-industry ties and most connected industry. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
In addition to the number of cross-industry pairs, ties, mean degree, and most connected 
industry, the analysis also compares the breadth of ties in the regional networks. In 1980, LA’s 
industries were linked to a broader range of sectors, with 11 industries tied to five or more 
industries, while the Bay Area had eight. By 1995, however, LA had only seven industries that 
were connected to five or more other industries against 11 in the Bay Area. By 2010, Los 
Angeles had no industries connected to five or more other industries, and the Bay Area had 
four. Against a backdrop of declining inter-industry links, the Bay Area’s network remains 
broader than that of LA.  
 
In sum, from comparable starting points in 1982, the Los Angeles and Bay Area social 
networks under investigation have diverged over the study period. Over time the networks of 
corporate directors in the Bay Area maintain a high degree of social relations, and these social 
relations consistently cross-industrial boundaries. Despite the Los Angeles metro-region 
having a more diverse industrial structure, evident both in its overall economy and its largest 
corporations, its business leaders over time appear to become isolated from each other, both in 
relation to its recent past, and to its northern neighbour.  
 
Conclusion  
The research in this article reveals a divergence in the network structures of interlocking 
corporate boards of the largest firms in the Bay Area and Los Angeles metropolitan regions 
over the three decades of economic divergence, 1980 to 2010. Network analyses reveal that the 
two regional networks were remarkably similar back in the early 1980s in terms of industrial 
composition, connectivity and cross-industry bridging relations. Over the subsequent three 
decades, however, the Bay Area’s network of corporate interlocks maintains its degree of 
overall connectivity, its degree of bridging relations across industrial boundaries, and by 2010 
is characterized by a well-connected and centrally positioned BCO, the Bay Area Council. It 
does so against the odds given greater specialization and corporate concentration in fewer 
industries. The LA network, on the other hand, fragments substantially in terms of both overall 
connectivity and cross-industry relations, and by 2010 its most central BCO, the LA Chamber 
of Commerce, is much less connected and central than its Bay Area counterpart.  
 
Over the divergence period the Bay Area was better able to combine and recombine its 
assets, people and organizations in response to new challenges and opportunities in an 
emerging ‘new economy’. Our findings support the theory in economic sociology that this 
recombinatory process was enabled by a more connected and diverse social context, which 
generated a critical mass of entrepreneurial ventures and innovation. The industrial structure 
thus developed down a high-road economic trajectory, raising the region’s per capita income 
by 2010 to levels higher than regions with comparable initial factor endowments. LA’s 
industrial social structure, on the other hand, for whatever reasons beyond the scope of this 
article, became increasingly fragmented. Theory would hold that the region was thus less able 
to re-combine its assets, people and organizations in response to the changing economic context 
of globalization and technological change. As a result it was less able to steer its industrial 
structure down new high-waged economic trajectories due to its much lower level of 
innovation and entrepreneurship.  
 
These findings however do not explain why the relational social structures of the Bay Area 
and Los Angeles regions diverged in the first instance, especially given their similarities back 
in 1980. Both regions faced the challenges and opportunities of the New Economy with a 
comparable industrial structure, human capital and level of technological sophistication. In-
depth historical analysis in a recent book co-authored by Storper, Kemeny, Makarem and 
Osman (Storper et al., 2015) explores the roles of first-nature geography, inter-jurisdictional 
politics, perceptions and world views of business and political elites, corporate practices and 
attitudes, and civil-society dynamics in shaping the social context of the two regions. The 
network findings are a reflection of complex social, economic and political dynamics that have 
shaped the development of these two regions over the course of the 20th Century.  
 
What the findings in this research do show is that the structure of social networks in the Bay 
Area and Los Angeles diverged over the period of economic divergence and did so in a way 
that is consistent with theory in the social capital and economic sociology literatures that social 
contexts. Irrespective of the causes behind this divergence in social structures, the research 
confirms an association between innovation and entrepreneurship in the face of economic 
challenges and opportunities on the one hand, and diverse and connected business networks on 
the other. This raises important implications for policy makers and BCOs about the strategic 
role they can play in encouraging bridging relations between influential actors from across 
diverse regional industrial communities.  
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Notes: 
(1) The Bay Area region is composed of 10 counties: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, 
San Francisco, San Mateo, Santa Clara, Solano, Sonoma and Santa Cruz.  
(2) The Los Angeles region is composed of 5 counties: Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange, San 
Bernardino and Ventura  
(3) While differences in regional, county and city-level governance systems exist, research by 
Taner Osman in a recent book by Michael Storper, Tom Kemeny, Naji P. Makarem and Taner 
Osman titled “The rise and fall of regional economies: Lessons from Los Angeles and San 
Francisco” (Storper et al., 2015) concludes that these systems are either too weak or un-
coordinated to explain the economic divergence of these two metropolitan regions. 
(4) Analysis of median incomes reveals the same story of divergence between 1980 and 2010 
(Makarem, 2013). 
(15) A project of the Building Resilient Regions Network, funded by the John D and Catherine 
T MacArthur Foundation. Manuel Pastor, Justin Scoggins, T William Lester, Karen Chapple, 
Building Resilient Regions database [Machine-readable database]. Los Angeles, CA: The USC 
Program for Environmental and Regional Equity (PERE). 
(5) For a much more detailed investigation of factors behind the divergence see Storper et al., 
2015. The authors conclude that none of these factors can sufficiently explain the divergence, 
and moreover that the economic divergence is best explained by the distinct trajectories of the 
two regions’ industrial structures and innovation capacities. Moreover their analysis shows 
that, consistent with the Balassa- Samuelson effect, the success of the Bay Area’s innovative 
high-waged industries spillover into lower-waged sectors of the economy, raising the income 
of most workers compared to their equivalent counterparts in Los Angeles.  
(6) Unfortunately the board members of most business-civic organizations in earlier periods 
were not available.  
(7) Earliest available year with revenues ranked by State, which were manually ranked by our 
two regions using business address.  
(8) Details of the rules used are available upon request. 
(9) A component is a network of nodes connected to one another. A social structure can be 
composed of more than one component if actors form more than one component, i.e. there is 
more than one network of connected nodes in the overall social structure (John is connected to 
Bill and Sarah in one component, and Roger is connected to Stuart in a second component – 
Thus forming a network composed of two components, with the largest component consisting 
of 3 connected actors).  
(14) Borgatti S P, Everett M G, Freeman L C, 2002, Ucinet for Windows: Software for Social 
Network Analysis (Analytic Technologies, Harvard, MA) 
(11) A random network is constructed by randomly selecting a given number of ties between 
the nodes in a network. 
(12) The probability that a random tie between two firms crosses an industrial boundary is 
higher in LA because firms in the 2010 LA sample is distributed more evenly across a broader 
number of industries. 
(13) Firms categorized into distinct 2-Digit SIC codes might in fact be in different sub-sectors 
(the 2-Digit SIC codes) within the same broad industry. 
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